TSR Desk · science · 26 September 2026, 01:00 UTC
Baszta: Data-Centric Fine-Tuning of a Polish Multi-Label Safety Classifier
- What
- Baszta: Data-Centric Fine-Tuning of a Polish Multi-Label Safety Classifier
- Who
- arxiv.org
- When
- 25 September 2026, 04:00 UTC
- Category
- Science
- Primary source
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29266
- What is not known
- This brief does not claim independent replication. Claims that appear only on X and not in the primary source stay unknown.
We develop a multi-label Polish content-safety classifier by fine-tuning allegro/herbert-base-cased (124M) across five categories (hate, vulgarity, sexual content, crime, self-harm) using a Focal + R-Drop objective, and evaluate the resulting model against Bielik Guard (S\'ojka) on the shared out-of-distribution Gadzi J\k{e}zyk benchmark. It comes from a paper posted to arXiv on 25 September 2026. Both systems are given per-category threshold tuning on the same calibration split. Under that matched protocol our model holds a small but statistically significant lead in micro F1, while an apparent macro-F1 lead does not survive: it was an artifact of comparing a tuned model against an untuned one. We also report what that micro figure is worth. Because Gadzi J\k{e}zyk is 97% crime-positive, a classifier that flags crime on every input and nothing else already scores 0.910 micro F1 on the same test split, so micro separates neither system from a degenerate strategy and macro is the column that does. Per-category and per-protocol figures are reported in Section 4. The residual out-of-distribution gap is one of calibration rather than discrimination. Ranking quality stays high while positive probabilities collapse, and per-category temperature scaling recovers the loss where Platt scaling and isotonic regression do not. That recovery turns out to be conditional on the calibration set containing safe text. Gadzi J\k{e}zyk contains almost none, so thresholds fitted on it flag crime on every safe input, and a balanced refit buys a deployable operating point at the cost of adversarial recall. We report both operating points rather than only the flattering one. Two changes that are standard practice, per-class cost-sensitive weighting and mean pooling, each raise in-distribution macro F1 while lowering the out-of-distribution figure, which indicates that robustness has to be selected for directly rather than inherited from in-distribution accuracy.
Why it counts
We develop a multi-label Polish content-safety classifier by fine-tuning allegro/herbert-base-cased (124M) across five categories (hate, vulgarity, sexual content, crime, self-harm) using a Focal + R-Drop objective, and evaluate the resulting model against Bielik Guard (S\'ojka) on the shared out-of-distribution Gadzi J\k{e}zyk benchmark.
Sources
Primary source: primary source
What is not known
This brief does not claim independent replication. Claims that appear only on X and not in the primary source stay unknown.
No clip. The article still stands.